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ABSTRACT
In the literature two major hypotheses have been developed for Employee Stock
Ownership Plans used as a takeover defense, the management entrenchment and
shareholder interest hypotheses, with the existing research not finding conclusive
evidence for either one. In this paper we provide evidence that the entrenchment
hypothesis is not supported by finding that Employee Stock Ownership Plan firms pay
less to their managers than non-Employee Stock Ownership Plan firms. If managers
were truly entrenched they would have been able to expropriate wealth from the existing
shareholders, which appears not to be the case for Employee Stock Ownership Plan
firms.
INTRODUCTION
In this study we test the hypothesis of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
being used to entrench management by examining management compensation. We
study a sample of pooled cross-section and time-series data of manager compensation in
the period 1996-2001 to determine how ESOP presence affects managerial
entrenchment. We find evidence that the entrenchment hypothesis is not supported by
finding that ESOP firms pay less to their managers than non-ESOP firms. If managers
were truly entrenched they would have been able to expropriate wealth from the existing
shareholders, which appears not to be the case for ESOP firms.
The contribution of our study is that we attempt to fill the void in the literature of
managerial compensation by examining ESOP as a form of entrenching managers and
destruction of shareholder value. ESOPs are different from the other blockholder types
because of their legal structure. ESOPs are structured as defined contribution pension
plans that are legally required to hold at least 50% of their investments in the
sponsoring firm’s stock. The pension plan is managed by a management appointed
trustee, who is responsible for voting the unallocated ESOP shares.
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
The research in ESOPs has been primarily focused on firm performance
(Borstadt and Zwirlein, 1995) and long run value effects to shareholders. Most of these
studies find evidence that ESOPs are related to firm value (Chaplinsky and Niehaus,
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1994; Pugh, Jahera and Oswald, 1999; Cramton, Mehran and Tracy, 2005 to name a
few). This is not surprising considering the high profile cases of creation and destruction
of value in firms adopting an ESOP. For example, in 2007 in a highly publicized
acquisition Sam Zell, the real estate magnate, acquired the Tribune Company by
contributing only 4% of the $8.2 billion price of the company, by designing a deal that
involved a tax beneficial ESOP, which preserved current management (Creswell and
Bajaj, 2007). In 2008 Tribune Co. filed for bankruptcy.
In this study we approach the problem of value effects to shareholders by
examining entrenchment of managers. Two alternative hypotheses have been put forth
in the literature with regards to the role of ESOPs as a defensive mechanism: the
management entrenchment hypothesis and the shareholder interest hypothesis (also
known as the convergence of interests hypothesis).
The first hypothesis suggests that managers expropriate wealth from
shareholders after obtaining protection from removal via an entrenchment tool.
Entrenchment occurs when managers adopt policies and act in such a way that their
removal becomes costly to shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The adoption of
antitakeover provisions thus makes the removal of managers costly relative to the
alternative, their retention. Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1994) find that ESOPs are a strong
deterrent to takeover. The predominant view in the literature, as pointed out by Scholes
and Wolfson (1989), is that the takeover defense benefits of ESOPs are the primary
motivating factor for establishing ESOPs relative to their tax benefits, improvements in
employee productivity and costs. Scholes and Wolfson (1989) suggest that ESOPs can be
very costly, considering the share-repurchase obligations towards departing employees.
When employees depart the company must repurchase their stock. Considering that the
company must refinance at this time, strain on the company finances usually occurs.
Additionally, ESOPs can help entrench management. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005)
provide evidence for the costs of managerial entrenchment. They study charter-based
and bylaws-based staggered boards and their impact on market values and find that
charter-based staggered boards are negatively related to market values. Their findings
are in support of the hypothesis that entrenchment is negatively related to firm value.
Also, Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino (1997) find that adoption of antitakover
amendments results in managers obtaining and maintaining above market levels of
compensation.
The second hypothesis implies that entrenchment has no negative effects on
shareholder value. This hypothesis is based on the notion that after obtaining the
necessary protection from removal, managers have more time to focus on increasing
shareholder value, compared to managers who spend significant amounts of time
devising strategies to fend off removal and stay in office. Ultimately, the managers are
compensated and retained for performance in terms of maximizing shareholders’ value,
Almazan and Suarez (2003) argue that a certain level of entrenchment might be
beneficial to shareholders.
However, there is no conclusive empirical support for either hypothesis in the
literature. The reason for the lack of conclusive support for either hypothesis might be
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due to the diverse factors that might affect entrenchment. The presence of a large
shareholder, who is involved in the day-to-day management of the firm, and closely
monitors or works with the CEO (such as a family, who have long term interests in the
performance of the company) might have an impact on the compensation of the CEO,
relative to the compensation of the CEO if such a large shareholder is not present. Yet,
another variation in CEO compensation might occur when there is a large shareholder
who is not actively involved in the management of the company (such as mutual funds,
which predominantly have short term investment objectives). Additionally, the CEO
might be the largest shareholder in the company, in which case the compensation might
be completely different from the situations discussed above.
Recent studies concur with these implications. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find that
occupational pension funds in the UK do not effectively monitor firms that they are
invested in. They find that the pension funds are passive investors that are not actively
involved in the management of the firm contrary to expectations. Core, Holthausen and
Larcker (1999) find that CEO compensation is a decreasing function of the existence of
an external stakeholder with more than 5% ownership and the stake owned by the CEO.
They also find that firms that exhibit internally weaker boards have greater agency
problems, and the CEOs in these firms are compensated excessively, and perform worse.
In a recent article Hartzell and Starks (2003) empirically show that higher institutional
ownership concentration is positively associated with the pay-for-performance
sensitivity of the executives’ compensation and negatively associated with the level of
the executive compensation. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005) study the relationship
between executive compensation and institutional monitoring, in terms of monitoring
costs of the institutions. They consider potentially active and potentially passive
institutions, their concentration and monitoring costs and find that pay-forperformance of executives is positively related to active institutions concentration and
not related to the passive institutions concentration. In another recent study Cronqvist
and Fahlenbrach (2006) study 13 different types of outside blockholders. They find that
the corporate policies in a firm – investment, financial, operational, and executive
compensation – are determined to a large extent by the type of large shareholder.
However, the authors focus on outside blockholders and ignore managerial, affiliated
and ESOP types of insider block ownership in their analysis. Chang (1990) finds that the
adoption of ESOPs supports both shareholder interest and managerial entrenchment
interests hypotheses depending on whether an ESOP is announced to be implemented
for employee compensation or take-over defense purpose. The reason for the conflicting
evidence might be due to the ambiguity of entrenchment. In general, entrenchment has
a negative connotation and is usually associated with a “bad” manager resisting
dismissal by the owners of the firm. At the same time, however, entrenchment can be
beneficial to the owners of the firm, because a “good” manager will be protected from
incurring costs of influencing the decision makers in terms of potential dismissal and
focusing on maximizing shareholder value instead (Milgrom, 1988).
We contribute to the finance literature by examining ESOP as a form of
entrenching managers and destroying shareholder value. The finance literature has not
conclusively determined whether ESOPs lead to corporate insiders’ entrenchment. We
provide a new perspective on the entrenchment of managers by considering an influence
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costs framework (Milgrom, 1988). The influence costs framework allows for the
development of empirical hypotheses of the influence of ESOPs on the entrenchment of
the corporate insiders. The influence costs framework suggests that by creating the
ESOP the management has an owner of the firm that is identifiable and understandable
to management and as such allows management to assess influence costs more
accurately. Of course, this is in relative terms, large blockholders are easily identifiable
but more powerful due to the nature of blockownership, of course the type of
blockholder will matter too.
The preliminary expectations are that the presence of ESOPs enhances the
influence of employees (with the exception of the CEO), and is negatively associated
with managerial (CEO) compensation and sensitivity. In this study the executive
compensation in the firm with a large ESOP block is examined for being different from
the compensation in firms without ESOPs. We focus on ESOP as a proxy for
entrenchment of management and ignore other entrenchment mechanisms.2 Naturally,
the other entrenchment mechanisms might play a role in the determination of CEO
compensation; however, as such they will appear in the error term of our model, and are
thus accounted for when analyzing in isolation the role of ESOP. The preliminary
expectations are based on the idea that the CEO of a firm with a large ESOP block would
be able to establish a preferential treatment in terms of compensation due to their
increased voting power that would affect the compensation negotiation process. In
contrast, in a firm without an ESOP block and thus an increased power of management
the CEO would be compensated more. Naturally, the presence of a large affiliated or
nonaffiliated blockholder, with at least 5% block ownership, might provide an additional
variation on the primary hypothesized relationships between CEO compensation, and
ESOP blockholdings.
Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested based on prior literature:
H0: CEO compensation is unaffected by the presence of ESOPs.
HA: CEO compensation is affected by the presence of ESOPs.
A regression analysis will help test the stated hypotheses. We use the regression to test
for the null hypotheses by studying the relationship of compensation and ESOP
ownership and control for other types of ownership as well, such as percentage
ownership by the firm’s officers and the percentage ownership by outsiders. In this
study we examine only public firms, which besides ESOPs, officers and blockholders
ownership have also dispersed individual investors’ ownership which insures that the
sum of the percentage ownership of ESOPs, officers and blockholders does not add up to
one:


      %   % 
#$%

 %!  " # 
#$&

' (#  )

(1)

2

Other takeover provisions are poison pills, staggered boards, golden parachutes, inside succession, dual position
(CEO and chairman, McWilliams and Sen, 1997), managerial tenure, state of incorporation and others.
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The rejection of the null hypothesis would suggest that managers are
compensated differently in ESOP firms and thus might be expropriating wealth from
shareholders dependant on the sign of the coefficient. If the sign is positive the
managers’ compensation is higher the larger the ESOP block which might indicate
expropriation of wealth. If the sign is negative the manager’s compensation is less the
higher the ESOP holdings and there might be no expropriation of wealth. We control for
size directly in the regression by using sales and return-on-assets because additional
variation of CEO compensation might be due simply to the size of the firm. We assume
no repricing of options and no backdating of options. We also consider compensation as
percentage of the firm’s sales to control for firm size as well directly in the analysis. The
error term of the model, ε, captures any other factors which might influence the
determination of the executive compensation such as other entrenchment mechanisms.
DATA
Blockholders Database is used to acquire data on blockholders of publicly traded
companies. Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick (2004) provide a detailed
discussion of the data in the Blockholders Database via Wharton Research Database
Services (WRDS). The blockholders in the database are classified as officer, director,
affiliated entity, ESOPs and outside blockholder. In addition we use EXECUCOMP and
COMPUSTAT databases to acquire data on executive compensation and company
specific data, respectively.
Executive compensation is comprised of salary, bonus, long term incentive plan
payouts, other annual compensation, options and stock awards. Following the Almazan,
Hartzell and Starks (2005) methodology we use the following three measures to identify
CEO compensation: salary, total compensation for the individual year (TDC1) and payfor-performance sensitivity (PFPS).
PFPS is calculated as delta times the number of options held, and the option’s
delta is calculated as in Burns and Kedia (2006). They calculate delta based on BlackScholes option pricing model adjusted for dividend payouts:
Δ   +,- ./0.01

(2)

where Z is computed based on the stock price S, exercise price X, time to maturity T,
risk free rate r, dividend yield d, and stock price volatility σ2.3 The fiscal year end stock
price S, and the stock price volatility σ2 are obtained from EXECUCOMP (and is
measured over 60 months prior to the fiscal year end of the stock price S). The risk free
rate r, is obtained from the Federal Reserve at St. Louis, and the natural logarithm of the
dividend yield d, is from EXECUCOMP, also, and φ, is the standard normal cumulative

3

Z is computed based on the following equation: Z =

ln(
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distribution function. Burns and Kedia make assumptions about the time to maturity of
the option grant T, and the option exercise price X. The time to maturity of unvested
options is the time to maturity of the most recent options grant minus one year, and for
vested options as the time to maturity of unvested options minus three years. The
exercise price X, is assumed to be the stock price at fiscal year end minus the profit per
option (where profit per option is calculated as the realizable value per option from
EXECUCOMP divided by the number of options at the fiscal year-end). Additionally, the
authors calculate deltas and option sensitivities for newly granted options, vested
options, and unvested options, which they sum up to obtain total option sensitivity.
Burns and Kedia also calculate convexity of the stock option grants, and it represents the
rate of change of the option’s delta to the stock price, and is as follows:
Γ=

e − dT φ ( Z )
* 0.01 ,
Sσ T

(3)

where the variables are as defined for the option’s delta, and gamma of options is the
sum of gammas of newly granted, unvested and vested options. Almazan, Hartzell and
Starks use a fourth measure of pay-for-performance sensitivity, which they find to be
significantly correlated with the measure PFPS, because of that we consider only the
three measures discussed above to identify CEO compensation.
ANALYSIS
To examine whether there is a difference between CEO compensation in ESOP
and non-ESOP firms we use three measures of compensation as discussed above and
control for profitability and firm size. A summary list of variables used in the analysis,
with their respective descriptions, is provided in Table 1.
Summary statistics of data used in the analysis are presented in Table 2. We pool
the cross-section of managers’ compensation and time-series for the period 1996-2001.
We end-up with 15,001 usable manager-year compensation observations. For the
calculation of the non-cash compensation, PFPS, we have no data for certain managers
causing the elimination of observations resulting in a sample of 12,301 observations.
Naturally, the reader might ask whether the truncation might bias our analysis. It is
possible that small companies might not have complete data. However, we control for
firm size by using sales as a variable in our analysis which will resolve the small
company issue. On the other hand, the selection bias imposed by examining only
available data cannot be avoided and as such is natural limitation of this study.
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Variable
SUMOUT

TABLE 1
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Definition
Percentage ownership by nonaffiliated blockholders

SUMESOP

Percentage ownership by the firm’s ESOP, but does not include
additional shares owned in a non-ESOP 401(k) plans

SUMOFF

Percentage ownership by the firm’s officers

SALARY

The dollar value of the base salary (cash and non-cash) earned by
the named executive officer during the fiscal year. Units:
Thousands of dollars

TDC1

Total compensation for the individual year, comprised of the
following: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted
Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using
Black-Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other
Total. Units: Thousands of dollars

PFPS4

The sensitivity of the options part of compensation to the change
in the stock price

SALES

Net sales

ROA

Return on assets

TABLE 2
SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS ON DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variables
N
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
SALARY
15001
426.53
273.04
0.00
6765.00
TDC1
15001
2784.25
8511.32
0.00
655448.00
PFPS
12301
757.65
21761.79
0.36
1971559.42
SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variables
N
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
SUMESOP 15001
1.42
4.07
0.00
36.10
SUMOFF
15001
1.60
5.74
0.00
53.40
SUMOFF
15001
13.37
13.20
0.00
82.64
SALES
15001
6681.90
14237.98
90.54
218529.00
ROA
15001
5.27
6.51
-96.00
57.47
Table 3 provides information about the number of unique firms with ESOP plans
in each year. The number of firms with ESOPs is relatively small compared to the total
4

PFPS is short for Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity.
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sample of firms in the Blockholders database, which is 1500. Considering that there are
companies with incomplete data in the six year period that we examine and the fact that
there are sometimes more than one blockholder per company the number of
observations in this study is not exactly 1500 companies multiplied by six years of data.
Nevertheless, the number of ESOP firms is comparable to the overall presence of ESOPs
in the economy (Uchitelle, 2007).

Year
ESOPs

1996
126

TABLE 3
NUMBER OF UNIQUE ESOPs
1997
1998
1999
129
128
116

2000
121

2001
115

The correlation among variables plays an important role for the selection of
variables to be used in the analysis. The correlations among variables are generally low
with the exception of sales, which is highly correlated with market value of the company
(results are not reported but are available upon request).5
One might argue that the compensation of managers is highly related to the size
of the company and its particular industry. Larger firms tend to pay higher salaries to
managers. Another consideration is that we analyze pooled cross-section and timeseries sample, in which inflation, particularly in managers’ salaries might drive the
results. To alleviate these concerns we also scale the dependent variables by sales.
Therefore, the scaled dependent compensation variables, Salarys, TDC1s and PFPSs,
capture the compensation of the officer relative to the company’s size and eliminate any
problems arising from company size and inflation.
The regression results are presented in Table 4. The dependent variables are
Salary, Salarys, TDC1, TDC1s, PFPS and PFPSs. The results from the multivariate
analysis, from both the nominal and scaled compensation variables, suggest that
managers in firms with ESOPs are paid differently than managers in non-ESOP firms
when salary and bonuses are considered, thus rejecting our null hypothesis. Considering
that the coefficient is negative it is reasonable to infer that the compensation of CEOs is
less in ESOP firms. For example, if we consider the scaled salary measure of
compensation, the marginal relative effect of an increase in ESOP ownership on
manager’s compensation is a negative 0.26. However, when compensation other than
cash is considered ESOP firms seem to have manager compensation similar to firms
that do not have ESOPs, the marginal effects are negative but statistically insignificant.
We also find that firms with outside blockholders such as families and mutual funds
provide lower compensation in terms of salary and bonuses, and that firms with large
holdings by officers provide higher compensation to the managers. The marginal effects
are statistically significant negative and positive, respectively.6

5

Therefore, because of multicollinearity we will exclude market capitalization from the analysis.
Regression results for PFPS and the scaled salary, TDC1 and PFPS measures are not reported in Table 4 in the
interest of brevity because of poor fit; however, the relation between the scaled dependant variables and independent
variables are similar to the non-scaled dependent variables regression results and are available upon request.
6
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TABLE 4
REGRESSION RESULTS, WHOLE SAMPLE
Independent
Variables

Dependent Variable for Each Regression

Intercept
SUMOFF
SUMESOP
SUMOUT
LSALES
ROA
Adjusted R2
N

-375.90 (13.57) ***
-3.06 (0.50) ***
3.65 (0.37) ***
0.17 (0.16)
100.48 (1.60) ***
0.84 (0.32) ***
0.2505
12,301

Salary

TDC1
-9972.19 (521.27) ***
-29.14 (19.12)
41.40 (14.15) ***
8.66 (6.19)
1583.71 (61.35) ***
21.10 (12.30) *
0.05027
12,301

Note: Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively

Examining the regression results in their statistical significance in isolation if
incomplete, this calls for the interpretation of their economic and financial meaning. For
example, salary is statistically affected by the percentage of ownership by ESOP plans in
their capital structure, with a statistically significant coefficient of -3.06. The financial
interpretation of this coefficient is that the increase in ESOP ownership by one
percentage point is associated with $3060 decrease in the CEO direct compensation.
When we analyze only firms with ESOP plans, presented in Table 5, we observe
that the combination of ESOP blockholder and outside blockholder results in a
reduction in the managers compensation, which is incompletely offset by manager
blockholders attempts to increase compensation.7
TABLE 5
REGRESSION RESULTS, ESOP FIRMS ONLY
Independent
Variables
Intercept
SUMOFF
SUMOUT
LSALES
ROA
Adjusted R2
N

Dependent Variable for Each Regression
Salary
-296.69 (34.02)***
10.10 (1.19)***
-1.32 (0.53)***
86.00 (3.84)***
3.92 (1.03)***
0.2502
1638

TDC1
-7972.01 (971.24)***
-0.84 (33.93)
-32.12 (15.26)**
1328.70 (109.56)***
10.57 (29.45)
0.0917
1638

PFPS
-75.59 (186.21)
0.99 (6.50)
-5.08 (2.93)*
33.60 (21.01)*
12.99 (5.65)**
0.0034
1638

Note: Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.
7
Regression results for the scaled salary, TDC1 and PFPS measures are not reported in Table 5 in the interest of
brevity because of poor fit; however, the relation between the scaled dependant variables and independent variables
are similar to the non-scaled dependent variables regression results and are available upon request.
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Contrast these results to the compensation patterns in firms that do not have
ESOP ownership. These results are presented in Table 6. In the firms without ESOP the
manager blockholders have a higher nominal compensation regardless if there are
outside blockholders or not. When scaled compensation is considered, our data suggests
that the presence of large outside owners offset the officer blockholders higher
compensation attempts.8
TABLE 6
REGRESSION RESULTS, NON-ESOP FIRMS ONLY
Independent
Variables
Intercept
SUMOFF
SUMOUT
LSALES
ROA
Adjusted R2
N

Dependent Variable for Each Regression
Salary

TDC1

-400.38 (14.79)***
3.19 (0.39) ***
0.34 (0.17) ***
103.60 (1.75) ***
0.57 (0.34) *
0.2542
10663

-10356 (583.79)***
44.55 (15.36) ***
11.49 (6.72) *
1631.93 (69.20) ***
20.44 (13.38)
0.0508
10663

PFPS
-1404.52 (1505.09)
-7.93 (39.60)
13.08 (17.32)
270.26 (178.35)
-4.45 (34.49)
0.0001
10663

Note: Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.

Chow Test results are presented in Table 7. The Chow Test is designed to
establish whether there is a structural difference in the parameters of two regression
models. The test has a null hypothesis structural similarity among the coefficients. Thus
our results suggest in an alternative way that the coefficients of the regression and thus
the compensation of managers in terms of salary and TDC1 are different in ESOP and
non-ESOP firms. We do not document a difference in the PFPS compensation of
managers in the two types of firms.

F Value
Prob>F

TABLE 7
CHOW TEST RESULTS
TDC1
PFPS
Salary
0.34
19.05***
3.21***
<.0001
0.0067
0.8861

Note: Asterisks ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.

CONCLUSION
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) can be used as a tax shelter, to
motivate employees, for acquisitions (leveraged ESOPs as in the example of Sam Zell’s
acquisition of Tribune Co.), and to protect the company from take-over. In the literature
8

Regression results for the scaled salary, TDC1 and PFPS measures are not reported in Table 6 in the interest of
brevity because of poor fit; however, the relation between the scaled dependant variables and independent variables
are similar to the non-scaled dependent variables regression results and are available upon request.
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two major hypotheses have been developed for ESOPs when they are used as a takeover
defense, the management entrenchment and shareholder interest hypotheses, with the
existing research not finding conclusive evidence for either one. In this paper we provide
evidence that the entrenchment hypotheses is not supported by finding that ESOP firms
pay significantly less to their managers than non-ESOP firms. If managers were truly
entrenched they would have been able to expropriate wealth from the existing
shareholders, which appears not to be the case for ESOP controlled firms.
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